Abstract

Volition, which MeSH classifies under mental processes, is voluntary activity without external compulsion, the capacity to initiate, direct and withhold action. Electrical activity over the scalp builds up before a self-paced movement and before people report the urge to move, but whether that build-up marks a decision or noise drifting toward a threshold is still disputed. Experiments on the sense of agency show that the feeling of being the author of an action can be shifted by timing and context. Willpower has proved harder to pin down: large preregistered replications found little or no evidence that self-control is used up by prior effort. Three interactive demonstrations present the Libet clock, a noisy accumulator and intentional binding.

Keywords: volition, will, readiness potential, sense of agency, self-control

Acting by choice, rather than in reply to a stimulus or under compulsion, is one of the most distinctive things people do, yet the scientific study of it arrived late. Haggard's review of the neuroscience of will records that the subject was long set aside as unscientific and that the mechanisms behind it were historically obscure (Haggard, 2008).

What changed matters was a set of timing experiments. Libet and colleagues asked people to note when they first wanted to move and compared that moment with the electrical preparation recorded from the scalp, and they reported that the brain's activity came first (Libet et al., 1983). The result, and the long argument about what it means, shape most of what follows.

Key Takeaways

  • The readiness potential, a slow build-up of electrical activity over the scalp before a self-paced movement, began before the reported urge to move in Libet's study of five subjects, whose urge times rested on their own recall of a clock position.
  • What the readiness potential means is disputed: one proposal treats it as the average of random neural fluctuations that happen to cross a threshold, a proposal meant for moments with no strong push to act, and whether the real decision comes late remains an open question.
  • The supplementary motor area and pre-supplementary motor area, regions on the inner surface of the frontal lobe, carry activity before self-initiated movement, and in one small study of ten participants a planned movement could still be cancelled until about 200 ms before it began.
  • The sense of agency, the experience of being the one who caused an action, can be studied through intentional binding, the perceived shortening of the gap between a voluntary act and its effect; involuntary movements reversed the effect, but whether binding reflects agency or the causal linking of events remains contentious.
  • Implementation intentions, if-then plans that tie a situation to a response, have been reported to help people reach goals, partly by handing the start of the action to the situation the plan names.
  • Ego depletion, the idea that self-control draws on a limited resource, is contested: preregistered replications across 23 and 36 labs found a pooled effect near zero and a non-significant confirmatory effect.

What Volition Is

Voluntary activity without external compulsion.

Scope note for the MeSH descriptor Volition (D014836), U.S. National Library of Medicine.

MeSH lists one entry term under this descriptor, Will, the older name for the same capacity to act by choice rather than compulsion.

A voluntary action is one that originates with the agent. A reflex or a response to a cue is triggered from outside; a voluntary act is generated internally and could, in principle, have been done differently or not at all. Laboratory work on the will therefore relies on tasks in which nothing external dictates the moment or the choice: people decide when to press a key, whether to move at all, or which of two options to take.

Haggard's (2008) review treats volition as a property of brain networks rather than of a single centre. On his reading, voluntary action depends on circuits linking frontal and parietal cortex, with the pre-supplementary motor area, anterior prefrontal regions and parietal cortex prominent, and the same review ties these circuits to conscious intention and to the sense of agency (Haggard, 2008).

Volition borders on several neighbouring constructs. An intention is the plan that a voluntary act carries out; motivation supplies the energy and direction that make a goal worth pursuing; and decision making covers the choice among options that often precedes acting. Volition is the step at which a choice is turned into action, held back, or kept on course.

The Readiness Potential and Libet's Experiment

The physiological story starts with a scalp potential. Kornhuber and Deecke's (1965) report on changes in brain potentials around voluntary and passive movements gave the readiness potential its name, the Bereitschaftspotential (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Recorded with electroencephalography and averaged over many trials, it appears as a gradual shift that precedes a self-paced movement.

Libet's contribution was to time the urge itself. Participants watched a spot revolving around a clock face, moved whenever they wished, and afterwards reported where the spot had been when they first felt the wish to move, a moment labelled W; they also reported when they actually moved (M) and, as a check on the method, when they felt a stimulus to the skin (S). The study was small, five subjects tested in at least six experimental sessions each, with readiness potentials averaged over series of 40 self-initiated movements (Libet et al., 1983). Onset of the readiness potential came before the reported W, so cerebral activity preceded the awareness of wanting to act. The authors distinguished two kinds of readiness potential, type I and type II, and noted that subjects in the type I series had done some preplanning; awareness throughout was judged from each subject's recall of the clock position (Libet et al., 1983).

Libet later drew out the implications. In his 1985 statement, the readiness potential began about −550 ms relative to movement and W about −200 ms, a lead of roughly 350 ms for the brain over the reported urge (Libet, 1985). He concluded that the initiative for a voluntary act is unconscious, but suggested that conscious will could still intervene in the last 100–200 ms before movement by vetoing the act. Libet reported that subjects could veto an act planned for a prearranged time within roughly the last 100–200 ms before it, and he checked each subject's error in clock reports against the reported timing of a skin stimulus (Libet, 1985). Figure 1 sets out the sequence schematically.

The first demonstration reproduces the clock procedure. A dot circles a clock face; the reader presses a key when the urge to move arises and then reports where the dot was at that moment. The display places the reported time on a timeline beside an illustrative readiness-potential curve and the moment of the press. The curve is drawn for teaching purposes and is not data.

Demo 1: the clock method

-800-600-400-2000200RP onsettypical Wmovementtime relative to movement (ms)
Start the clock, wait, and press whenever you feel like it. Then move the slider to where the spot was when the urge came.

Illustrative only: the curve and the marked times are schematic, not your brain activity, and your press stands in for the movement. The spot takes 2560 ms per turn, so each 6° step on the slider is about 43 ms.

Figure 1

The Timing of Brain Activity, Reported Urge and Movement in Libet's Task

Timeline of the readiness potential, the reported urge and the movement A horizontal time axis from 800 milliseconds before a movement to 200 milliseconds after it. A navy curve stays flat, then begins to rise at a dashed marker labelled readiness potential onset, about 550 milliseconds before the movement, and climbs steeply into the movement at zero. A green dashed marker labelled reported urge W sits about 200 milliseconds before the movement. A red line marks the movement at zero. -800 -600 -400 -200 0 200 time relative to movement (ms) readiness potential onset reported urge (W) movement
Note. An original schematic, not recorded data. It shows the order of events in the clock task: brain activity over the scalp begins to build well before the moment people later report as their first urge to move, and both come before the movement itself. The curve's shape is drawn for illustration only.

Reinterpreting the Readiness Potential

Later studies asked whether the readiness potential is really the precursor of a specific movement. Haggard and Eimer (1999) used the Libet method with fixed and freely chosen movements and focused on the lateralized readiness potential, the component that reflects preparation of one hand rather than the other. Its onset came significantly sooner when awareness was early than when it was late, whereas the readiness potential itself tended to begin later when awareness was early, and fixed and free movements did not differ (Haggard & Eimer, 1999). On this evidence the lateralized component is a better candidate than the general readiness potential for whatever process leads to awareness of moving.

A sharper challenge came from comparing decisions to move with decisions not to move. When participants chose on every trial between moving and withholding a movement, the preparatory activity that Trevena and Miller picked up with electrophysiological recording was no larger ahead of a choice to move than ahead of a choice to stay still, so it did not mark movement in particular (2010). The pre-decision activity was therefore not specific to movement, which undercuts the claim that it initiates the act (Trevena & Miller, 2010).

Schurger and colleagues then proposed a different origin for the signal. In their proposal, the readiness potential reflects spontaneous subthreshold fluctuations in neural activity, summed by a leaky stochastic accumulator; a movement is triggered when the accumulated activity happens to cross a decision threshold, and averaging trials time-locked to those crossings produces a slow ramp (Schurger et al., 2012). They supported the proposal with computer simulation and two EEG experiments, and limited it to situations in which the imperative to move is weak, as in tasks with no specific cue for when to act (Schurger et al., 2012). If the ramp is partly an averaging artefact, its early onset need not mark an early decision.

Decoding studies pushed the timing debate in another direction. Soon et al. (2008) reported that activity in prefrontal and parietal cortex predicted the outcome of a free decision up to 10 s before the person was aware of deciding. The authors presumed that this long lead reflects unconscious preparation, but did not show it (Soon et al., 2008).

Whether such results generalise from arbitrary to meaningful choices is a separate question. Maoz et al. (2019) recorded EEG from 18 subjects making donation decisions, some deliberate and some arbitrary. A readiness potential appeared before arbitrary choices but not before deliberate ones (Maoz et al., 2019). The second half of that finding is weaker than it sounds: the test for an early readiness potential in deliberate choices was non-significant and its Bayes factor inconclusive, and some subjects' easy arbitrary choices were slightly swayed by their preferences (Maoz et al., 2019).

A 2021 review drew these strands together. Schurger et al. (2021) questioned both the readiness potential's status as a decision signal and Libet's inference from it, setting an early-decision view, in which the ramp reflects a choice already made, against a late-decision view, in which commitment comes only shortly before movement. They concluded that which view better fits the data is still an open question, though the late-decision view has parsimony on its side, and that whether the readiness potential exists on single trials remains unresolved (Schurger et al., 2021).

The second demonstration shows how a ramp can emerge from noise alone. Many simulated trials of noisy activity drift toward a threshold, and a movement is triggered at each crossing. Averaging the traces backward from the crossings yields a slow rise resembling a readiness potential, and sliders adjust the noise and the drift. The simulation is seeded and illustrative, not data.

Demo 2: noise that drifts to a threshold

threshold: movement2 s before crossingcrossing
38 of 40 simulated trials reached the threshold (median wait 5.5 s). The navy line averages the 33 trials that crossed after at least 2 s, aligned to the crossing: a slow ramp appears even though no trial contained a planned build-up.

Illustrative simulation with a fixed seed: a leaky accumulator (leak 0.5, threshold 0.3) driven by a small steady input plus random noise. Gold lines are single trials. Lowering the drift makes crossings rarer and more noise-driven.

Brain Systems for Deciding, Acting and Withholding

Converging methods point to a medial frontal and parietal network. Haggard's (2008) review places the pre-supplementary motor area and anterior parts of the prefrontal cortex, together with parietal cortex, at the centre of voluntary action (Haggard, 2008).

Single-neuron recordings give the most direct view of the medial frontal contribution. Fried et al. (2011) recorded 1019 neurons in twelve subjects, among them 256 in the supplementary motor area, while the subjects made self-initiated finger movements and reported when they had decided to move. Firing in the supplementary motor area changed progressively up to about 1500 ms before the reported decision, and neuronal activity predicted the decision about 700 ms in advance with accuracy greater than 80% (Fried et al., 2011). The authors suggested, with computational support, that a decision emerges when firing crosses a threshold. The decision times, however, came from the subjects' own reports (Fried et al., 2011).

Attention can modulate the same region. When participants attended to their intention to move rather than to the movement itself, activity in the pre-supplementary motor area increased during self-paced actions, in an fMRI study (Lau et al., 2004).

Stimulation studies show that parietal cortex contributes to the experience of wanting to move. In patients undergoing surgery to remove brain tumours, direct electrical stimulation of parietal cortex produced a felt intention to move without any movement, and stronger stimulation led to the belief of having moved when no movement occurred (Desmurget et al., 2009). Stimulating premotor cortex produced the reverse dissociation, movements of which the patients were unaware.

Withholding an action has its own signature. In an fMRI study of intentional inhibition, activity in fronto-median cortex was greater when participants cancelled an action they had intended to make, which Brass and Haggard (2007) presented as a candidate area for this form of psychological inhibition rather than an established locus (Brass & Haggard, 2007).

How late can a planned movement be stopped? Schultze-Kraft et al. (2016) used a real-time brain–computer interface that monitored readiness potentials and issued a stop signal while participants prepared self-paced foot movements. Participants could cancel the movement until a point of no return about 200 ms before it began (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). The study analysed 10 of the 12 healthy adults recruited, tested only decisions about when and whether to move, and took no position on what the readiness potential represents (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). The result is consistent with a window for something like Libet's veto, though it does not show that conscious will does the vetoing.

The Sense of Agency

Put simply, the sense of agency is the experience of being the one whose actions bring about changes in one's surroundings. The theory of apparent mental causation holds that this experience is an inference: people feel they willed an act when a thought about the act comes just before it (priority), fits the act (consistency) and has no rival cause in view (exclusivity) (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Wegner (2002) developed the claim at book length, treating conscious will as a constructed feeling rather than a direct readout of the cause of behaviour (Wegner, 2002). The original paper's single experiment illustrated only the priority principle, and the authors showed that actions people were forced into could be misread as intended (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). The theory's standing is contested. Its main rival ties the sense of agency to motor commands, the signals that specify an intended movement, and to the comparison built on them, an approach usually called the comparator model; Frith and colleagues proposed motor commands as one basis of action awareness, in a framework they put forward rather than tested (Frith et al., 2000). In a theoretical paper that reported no new data, Synofzik et al. (2008) argued that a comparator explains neither the feeling nor the judgment of agency, and offered instead a two-step account in which several indicators of agency are weighted together. Moore's (2016) review sets both accounts beside a cue-integration view, in which inference about thought and action is only one cue among several, and adds that cue integration itself still needs fuller examination (Moore, 2016).

An implicit measure, probably the most widely used one, grew out of a timing illusion (Moore, 2016). Haggard et al. (2002) found that when a voluntary action produced an effect, people perceived the action and the effect as closer together in time than they were. Involuntary movements reversed the effect, pushing the perceived times apart (Haggard et al., 2002). The phenomenon became known as intentional binding. A review of nearly 10 years of work treated binding as a measure of the sense of agency, while cautioning that the link between the two had not been fully explained and that open questions remained (Moore & Obhi, 2012). That reading has been challenged: in a virtual-reality experiment whose stimuli were matched for timing and position, binding of the same size appeared whether or not an intentional action was involved, so the effect may reflect the causal binding of linked events rather than agency itself (Suzuki et al., 2019). On this view, treating binding as a sign of agency needs evidence beyond the binding effect alone (Suzuki et al., 2019).

Researchers also separate the immediate feeling of agency from a considered judgment of agency. The distinction comes from Synofzik et al. (2008); Moore (2016), reviewing it, points out that explicit agency ratings are prone to demand effects, and describes applied work on agency as still in its infancy (Moore, 2016). On the neural side, Haggard (2017) reviewed the emerging picture of brain circuits for agency and its relation to responsibility, noting that its brain mechanisms have been investigated only recently and that the experience itself remains elusive (Haggard, 2017).

Even the judgment that one chose freely may be assembled after the fact. In two behavioural experiments using a stop-signal procedure, Kühn and Brass (2009) found evidence that people construct their judgment of having freely chosen retrospectively (Kühn & Brass, 2009).

The third demonstration presents the binding effect. A key press is followed by a tone after a set delay, and the reader estimates that delay once for a voluntary press and once for a passive press caused from outside. The display then shows how binding would shorten the estimated interval for the voluntary press. The values are illustrative, not data.

Demo 3: does a chosen action pull its effect closer?

actual250 msvoluntary (illustrative)200 mspassive (illustrative)275 ms
Press the button, watch for the flash, then estimate how long the gap felt.

Illustrative only: the voluntary and passive bars use fixed proportions (0.8 and 1.1 of the actual delay) chosen to show the direction of the effect, not measured values. A single estimate in a browser is not an experiment.

From Intention to Action

Psychologists have long separated choosing a goal from carrying it out. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987) studied thought contents and cognitive functioning in motivational as against volitional states of mind (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). The contrast divides deliberating about which goals to adopt from implementing one already chosen, and is often described as a difference between deliberative and implemental states of mind.

Implementation intentions belong to the implementing side. They are if-then plans that specify a situation and the response to make when it arises, and they work alongside goal intentions, which state only what a person wants to achieve. In a review of his research programme, Gollwitzer (1999) reported strong effects of such plans on goal attainment and attributed them to heightened accessibility of the situational cues named in the plan and to more automatic initiation of the planned action, which lends a chosen response some of the immediacy of habits (Gollwitzer, 1999). Across a correlational study and two experiments, Gollwitzer and Brandstätter (1997) found that people who had formed implementation intentions completed difficult goals more often and, when the moment they had chosen came, got the intended action started sooner. The first study was correlational, so on its own it cannot establish that the plans caused the difference (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) later published a meta-analysis of the effects and processes of implementation intentions in reaching goals (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006).

Willpower and the Ego-Depletion Debate

Self-control is the side of volition that overrides a prepotent urge, the opposite pole from impulsive behavior, and it is closely tied to executive function. The strength model of self-control treats it as drawing on a limited resource. Its founding paper asked whether the active self is such a resource and introduced the term ego depletion for the reduced self-control thought to follow an earlier act of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998). The strength model's standing is now contested, because large preregistered replications found little or no effect (Hagger et al., 2016; Vohs et al., 2021). A rival process model holds that exerting self-control does not drain a resource but shifts motivation and attention, and that these shifts are what undermine self-control on the next task (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). Its authors acknowledged that the evidence for the model was lacking in places (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012).

The first of those replications pooled data from 23 labs and 2,141 participants who completed the same sequential-task protocol. The ego-depletion effect was close to zero, d = 0.04, with a 95% CI of [−0.07, 0.15] that includes zero; earlier meta-analyses had already suggested bias in the published literature (Hagger et al., 2016).

A second test, run in 36 labs with 3,531 participants and two depletion procedures, took a paradigmatic approach. Its preregistered confirmatory effect was not significant (Vohs et al., 2021). Across the full sample a tiny effect did reach significance, but Bayesian analysis of that sample was inconclusive, and the moderator analyses, including a larger effect among participants reporting more fatigue, were exploratory only (Vohs et al., 2021). Taken together, the two projects leave the strength model without the robust effect its founding claims implied, while not ruling out a small effect under particular conditions.

Disorders of Volition

Loss of volition is a clinical problem as well as a philosophical one. Avolition, a marked reduction in self-initiated, goal-directed activity, overlaps with the broader clinical notion of apathy. A narrative review by Foussias and Remington (2010) argued that avolition is a core negative symptom of schizophrenia, alongside diminished expression, and, pointing to intact emotional experience and consummatory pleasure, questioned whether anhedonia is present in the illness at all (Foussias & Remington, 2010). The review also judged that the core deficit needs further clarification (Foussias & Remington, 2010).

Other disorders disturb not the initiation of action but the awareness and control of it. Frith et al. (2000) proposed that awareness of action draws on both sensory signals and the stream of motor commands; they traced the felt movement of phantom limbs and in anosognosia to motor commands, and utilization behaviour and delusions of control to an impaired link between intention and action (Frith et al., 2000).

Worked Example

The ego-depletion replications illustrate why a small effect needs a very large study. The calculation below is this article's own illustration and comes from no study; only its starting point is empirical, the near-zero pooled effect of d = 0.04 in the 23-lab replication (Hagger et al., 2016).

For a comparison of two independent groups with a two-sided test at alpha .05 and 80% power, the number of participants needed in each group is approximately 2 × (1.96 + 0.84)² / d², which equals 15.68 / d². An illustrative effect of d = 0.6 needs about 15.68 / 0.36, or 44 participants per group. Halving the effect to d = 0.3 quadruples the requirement to about 175 per group. An effect of d = 0.04 needs 15.68 / 0.0016, or about 9,800 participants per group, some 19,600 in all.

The arithmetic shows the scale of the problem. A study with a few dozen people per group cannot reliably detect an effect as small as the one the replications measured, and a small study that does reach significance tends to overestimate the true effect. Table 1 sets out the calculation.

Table 1

Participants Needed to Detect an Effect of a Given Size

Effect size (d)LabelParticipants per groupTotal participants
0.6Large (illustrative)4488
0.3Small to medium (illustrative)175350
0.1Small (illustrative)1,5683,136
0.04Near zero9,80019,600

Note. Values come from this article's own illustrative calculation, not from data. Each row uses n per group = 2 × (1.96 + 0.84)² / d², for a two-group comparison with a two-sided test at α = .05 and 80% power, rounded up. The smaller the effect, the faster the required sample grows: halving d multiplies it by four.

Discussion

Some conclusions about volition are secure. Brain activity precedes self-paced movement and precedes the moment at which people report the urge to move. Medial frontal and parietal regions contribute to initiating, experiencing and withholding action, as recordings, imaging and stimulation agree. The felt sense of agency is not a fixed readout: timing and context can shift it, and people can misread actions they were forced into as their own choices.

Other questions remain open. The meaning of the readiness potential is the first. A signal that is no stronger before deciding to move than before deciding not to, that can arise from averaging noise to a threshold, and that may not exist on single trials is a weak basis for saying the brain decides before the person does. The second is generalisation: most of the evidence comes from arbitrary choices about when to press a key, and the one direct comparison with deliberate choices found a different pattern, albeit with inconclusive evidence for the absence of the signal. The third is willpower. The strength model's central prediction has failed in two large preregistered tests, and what remains is at most a small, condition-dependent effect.

The free-will debate sits on top of these uncertainties. A review of the evidence argued that Libet-style experiments do not disprove free will, emphasising conditional intentions and challenging the common interpretation of the data rather than settling the metaphysical question (Brass et al., 2019). Beliefs about free will may matter in their own right: in two experiments, participants who read a text promoting determinism cheated more, whereas reading a text endorsing free will did not change cheating (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Pooling 145 experiments on manipulations of this kind, 95 of them never published, a meta-analysis found that the manipulations did lower belief in free will but found no evidence that they altered later behaviour (Genschow et al., 2023).

Current Directions

Recent work has shifted from asking whether the brain decides before awareness to asking what the premovement signal is. The 2021 review of the readiness potential frames the field as a contest between early-decision and late-decision views and leaves the second open (Schurger et al., 2021). Comparisons of deliberate with arbitrary choices address the long-standing worry that key-press tasks say little about decisions that matter (Maoz et al., 2019), and closed-loop brain–computer interfaces now let experimenters probe how late an action can be cancelled (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016).

Agency research is moving toward its brain circuitry (Haggard, 2017) and toward applications, which remain at an early stage (Moore, 2016). In self-control, ego depletion has now been tested in preregistered studies run across many laboratories at once (Hagger et al., 2016; Vohs et al., 2021). On the conceptual side, Brass and colleagues have argued that the common interpretation of Libet-style experiments is questionable and that neuroscience has not disproved free will (Brass et al., 2019).

Common Misconceptions

Libet's results prove that free will is an illusion.
A review of Libet-style experiments concluded that they do not disprove free will, chiefly by contesting the usual interpretation of the data (Brass et al., 2019). The belief persists because the original finding, brain activity before the reported urge, is real; what does not follow is that the reported urge is causally idle.
The readiness potential is the brain's decision to move.
A 2021 review questioned the readiness potential as a decision signal, set early-decision and late-decision views against each other, and treated the late-decision view as an open question (Schurger et al., 2021). The slow ramp seen in averaged recordings may partly reflect noise crossing a threshold rather than a choice made in advance.
Feeling that one caused an action is proof that one did.
The feeling of will can be inferred from the timing and fit of thought and action, and actions people are forced into can be misread as intended (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).
Willpower is a fuel that is used up by every act of self-control.
A 36-lab preregistered test found no significant confirmatory ego-depletion effect, and Bayesian evidence across the full sample was inconclusive (Vohs et al., 2021). Earlier meta-analyses had doubted how large the effect was, or whether it existed, and found signs of possible bias (Hagger et al., 2016).

Glossary

Avolition.
A marked loss of self-initiated, goal-directed activity, regarded as a core negative symptom of schizophrenia, though its underlying deficit still needs clarification.
Ego depletion.
The proposed weakening of self-control after an earlier act of self-control; large preregistered replications found little or no such effect.
Free will.
The capacity to choose and act in a way that is genuinely up to the agent; neuroscientific timing studies have not settled whether people have it.
Implementation intention.
An if-then plan naming a situation and the response to make in it, used to help carry out a goal by letting the named situation trigger the response.
Intentional binding.
The perceived shortening of the interval between a voluntary action and its effect, used as a measure of the sense of agency; involuntary movements reverse it.
Lateralized readiness potential.
The part of premovement scalp activity that reflects preparing one hand rather than the other, whose onset has been found to vary with the timing of awareness.
Pre-supplementary motor area.
A region of medial frontal cortex, just in front of the supplementary motor area, implicated in internally generated action and in attending to one's intentions.
Readiness potential.
A gradual build-up of electrical activity over the scalp, seen in averaged recordings before a self-paced movement, whose meaning is disputed.
Sense of agency.
The felt experience of authoring one's own actions and, by way of them, the outcomes they produce around one.
Strength model of self-control.
The contested proposal that self-control draws on a limited resource that earlier acts of self-control deplete.
Theory of apparent mental causation.
The contested claim that the feeling of willing an act is inferred from a thought that precedes the act, fits it and has no rival cause.
Veto.
The cancelling of an action already in preparation; Libet reported that people could veto an act planned for a prearranged time in its last 100–200 ms.
Volition.
Voluntary activity without external compulsion; the capacity to start, steer and hold back action by choice.
W judgment.
A participant's report, read from a revolving clock, of when the wish to move was first felt; it rests on recall and carries self-report error.
Will.
The traditional name for volition, listed by MeSH as its entry term.

Key Researchers

Roy F. Baumeister

(University of Queensland). Social psychologist who proposed that acts of self-control draw on a limited resource, the ego-depletion idea. ORCID · Wikipedia

Marcel Brass

(Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin). Cognitive neuroscientist who studies intentional action and the decision to withhold an action. ORCID

Itzhak Fried

(University of California, Los Angeles; Tel Aviv University). Neurosurgeon and neuroscientist who records single neurons in patients, including activity before self-initiated movements. Faculty page

Peter M. Gollwitzer

(New York University; University of Konstanz). Psychologist who developed implementation intentions and, with Heinz Heckhausen, distinguished deliberating about goals from implementing them. ORCID · Wikipedia

Patrick Haggard

(Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London). Cognitive neuroscientist who studies voluntary action and the sense of agency, including the intentional binding effect. ORCID · Wikipedia

Benjamin Libet

(University of California, San Francisco; 1916–2007). Neuroscientist who timed the readiness potential against the moment people reported first wanting to move. Wikipedia · Wikidata

Aaron Schurger

(Chapman University). Cognitive neuroscientist who proposed that the readiness potential reflects accumulating neural noise rather than an early decision. ORCID · Faculty page

Daniel M. Wegner

(Harvard University; 1948–2013). Social psychologist who argued that the feeling of willing an act is inferred from the timing and fit of thought and action. Wikipedia · Wikidata

Frequently Asked Questions

What is volition in psychology?

Volition is the capacity to start, direct and hold back action by choice rather than under compulsion. A major review traces its brain basis to networks linking frontal and parietal cortex (Haggard, 2008).

Did Libet show that free will is an illusion?

No. A later review argued that Libet-style experiments do not disprove free will, although its case rests on challenging the usual interpretation of those experiments rather than on new data (Brass et al., 2019).

What does the readiness potential actually reflect?

Its meaning is unsettled. A 2021 review questioned whether it marks an early decision and judged that the alternative, a decision made late, is still an open question (Schurger et al., 2021).

Can a person stop a movement after the brain has started preparing it?

In a brain and computer interface study of ten analysed participants, a planned foot movement could still be cancelled until a point of no return about 200 ms before it began (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016).

What is intentional binding?

It is the tendency to perceive a voluntary action and its effect as closer together in time than they are. Involuntary movements reversed the effect in the study that introduced it (Haggard et al., 2002).

Is ego depletion real?

The evidence is weak. A preregistered replication across 23 labs and 2,141 participants found a pooled effect of d = 0.04, with a confidence interval that included zero (Hagger et al., 2016).

What are implementation intentions?

They are if-then plans that link a particular situation to a planned response. A review of the research programme reported strong benefits for goal attainment and traced them to the plan handing control of the response to the situation it names (Gollwitzer, 1999).

What is avolition?

Avolition is a marked loss of self-initiated, goal-directed activity. A review argued that it is a core negative symptom of schizophrenia, while noting that the underlying deficit needs further clarification (Foussias & Remington, 2010).

References

Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5), 1252–1265. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252

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