Abstract

Sexual behavior is a form of behavior: the actions through which organisms seek, initiate, and engage in sexual activity, together with the choices that surround them. Cognitive psychology enters from two directions: sexual conduct is an output of decision processes that are acutely state-dependent, so that transient sexual arousal reshapes preference in a “heat of the moment” that cold-state planning badly mispredicts. It is also governed by a dual-process contest between a deliberate reflective system and a fast impulsive one, formalised in sexuality science as competing excitation and inhibition systems. Sexual risk, in turn, tracks delay discounting and executive function, so cognition both produces sexual choices and is recruited to regulate them. Three interactive demonstrations trace arousal-driven preference reversal, sexual delay discounting, and the excitation–inhibition balance.

Keywords: sexual behavior, sexual arousal, decision-making, delay discounting, dual control model

A person decides, calmly and sincerely on a quiet afternoon, exactly how they will behave in a future sexual situation: what they will and will not do, what protection they will insist on. Hours later, aroused, they behave otherwise, and are later puzzled by the person who made those earlier promises. Nothing about their values changed; what changed was the state from which the decision was made. The behavior cognitive psychology must explain here is not a stable trait but a state-dependent reversal of preference — the systematic gap between how people predict they will act sexually and how they act once aroused (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006).

Sexual behavior was long studied mainly as physiology or as social norm. The cognitive turn treats it instead as a decision problem with unusual properties: its central drive is a visceral state that waxes and wanes on a fast timescale, distorting valuation while it lasts and leaving little trace once it passes (Loewenstein, 1996). That makes it a revealing test case for theories of self-regulation, intertemporal choice, and the two-system architecture of the deciding mind.

Key Takeaways
  • Sexual behavior is a state-dependent decision: transient sexual arousal predictably raises the appeal of risky and impulsive options, so cold-state intentions mispredict hot-state choices — the “heat of the moment” effect (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006).
  • Arousal is a visceral factor that distorts valuation while active and is hard to recall or anticipate once it fades, producing a systematic empathy gap between the cold and hot self (Loewenstein, 1996).
  • Dual-process self-regulation frames each sexual choice as a contest between a slow reflective system and a fast impulsive one; sexuality science formalises this as a balance of a sexual excitation system and a sexual inhibition system (Bancroft & Janssen, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).
  • Sexual risk tracks delay discounting: the steeper a person discounts delayed rewards, the less likely they are to defer gratification for a condom, a relationship measurable with the Sexual Discounting Task (Johnson & Bruner, 2012).
  • The link to cognition is bidirectional: weaker executive function predicts greater sexual risk-taking, so the control systems that regulate sexual choice are the same ones a risky choice can reflect (Rowe et al., 2021).

What Sexual Behavior Is

Sexual behavior, in the sense used by MeSH and by the behavioral sciences, is the set of activities by which organisms pursue and engage in sexual activity, together with the decisions, courtship, and risk choices that surround them. The cognitive interest is not in the physiology of the act but in the choosing that precedes and shapes it: when to initiate, with whom, under what precautions, and whether to defer. These are decisions, and they are made under a drive state unusual among human motivations for how sharply it rises and falls.

That state — sexual arousal — is what gives the topic its distinctive cognitive signature. Most decision research assumes a reasonably stable decision-maker whose preferences do not swing from minute to minute. Sexual arousal violates that assumption. It is a visceral factor: a bodily-motivational state that, while active, narrows attention onto the goal it serves and inflates the momentary value of acting on it, then recedes and leaves the person struggling to reconstruct why the choice felt so compelling (Loewenstein, 1996). Because the state is transient and hard to simulate in its absence, people systematically mispredict their own aroused behavior from a cold state, and mispredict their cold judgement while aroused — a bidirectional empathy gap.

The upshot is that sexual behavior is a natural laboratory for the parts of cognitive psychology concerned with self-control, intertemporal choice, and the interaction between affect and cognition. A single sexual decision can turn on how steeply the person discounts a delayed reward, on whether a reflective goal or an impulsive cue wins the moment, and on how much executive capacity is available to hold a plan in place against a strong drive. Each of these is a general cognitive mechanism that sexual behavior throws into unusually sharp relief.

Types of Sexual Behavior

Sexual behavior is the parent MeSH descriptor under the broader category of behavior, and its narrower terms name specific behaviors falling under it. The field treats these as an indexing classification, a convenience for retrieval rather than a cognitive taxonomy, so the categories below are not mutually exclusive and are not organised along any single underlying dimension; they overlap, sit at different levels of generality, and are grouped by topic rather than by a shared cognitive variable (Table 1). Only those with their own article on this site are linked.

Table 1

Types of Sexual Behavior Indexed Under the MeSH Descriptor

Type What it denotes
Chemsex Sexual activity undertaken under the influence of psychoactive drugs taken to facilitate or intensify it.
Coitus Sexual intercourse itself, the act most sexual decision-making ultimately concerns.
Courtship The signalling and mate-assessment behavior that precedes mating, a locus of social cognition.
Extramarital Relations Sexual activity outside a marriage or committed pair bond.
HIV Serosorting Choosing sexual partners, or precautions, by perceived HIV serostatus — a risk-management decision strategy.
Orgasm The peak of sexual response, a terminal reward in models of sexual motivation.
Safe Sex Practices adopted to reduce the risk of infection or unintended pregnancy, the protective pole of risk decisions.
Sex Work The exchange of sexual services for payment.
Sexual Abstinence The deliberate refraining from sexual activity, a sustained self-regulatory choice.
Sexual Harassment Unwanted sexual advances or conduct, a coercive violation rather than a consensual behavior.
Sexuality The broad capacity for sexual feelings, orientation, and identity.
Unsafe Sex Sexual activity carrying elevated risk of infection or unintended pregnancy, the risky pole of the same decision.

Figure 1

How Cognition Produces and Regulates Sexual Behavior

How cognition produces and regulates sexual behavior A cognition box on the left and a sexual behavior box on the right. A top arrow runs from cognition to sexual behavior, labelled arousal, visceral factors, and delay discounting. A bottom arrow runs back from sexual behavior to cognition, labelled executive function and self-regulation. The two arrows form a closed loop. Cognition valuation, control, attention Sexual behavior initiation, risk, precaution arousal · visceral factors · discounting executive function · self-regulation
Note. Sexual behavior is both a product of cognition and an influence on it. The top path (how states and valuation produce sexual choices) is the province of research on arousal, visceral factors, and delay discounting; the bottom path (how sexual choices recruit and reflect control) is the province of research on executive function and self-regulation. Because the loop runs both ways, weak regulatory capacity and risky sexual choice can reinforce one another (Rowe et al., 2021).

How Sexual Behavior Intersects Cognition

Cognitive psychology meets sexual behavior at two junctions, corresponding to the two arrows of Figure 1. The first treats sexual conduct as the downstream product of a decision made under a fluctuating drive state, where the central puzzle is why a calmly formed intention is so poorly honoured once arousal arrives. The second treats sexual risk as recruiting the control systems of the deciding mind, so that the same executive capacity that would hold a precaution in place is the capacity a risky choice reveals to be scarce. The two are joined: a strong visceral state does its damage precisely by overrunning limited regulatory resources.

Arousal and the heat of the moment: state-dependent valuation

The most direct cognitive contribution to sexual behavior is that preference is not fixed but state-dependent. In a landmark study, young men rated their attitudes toward a range of sexual activities and risks twice: once in a calm baseline state and once while sexually aroused. Arousal sharply raised the rated appeal of a wide range of activities, the willingness to engage in morally questionable tactics to obtain sex, and the willingness to forgo protection — and, crucially, the participants in the cold state did not anticipate the size of their own hot-state shift (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). The decision made in advance and the decision made in the moment were made, in effect, by two different people.

This is the behavioral signature of a visceral factor. Loewenstein's account holds that states such as hunger, pain, craving, and sexual arousal exert a direct, privileged influence on behavior that grows with their intensity, crowd out competing goals, and — the key cognitive point — are systematically underweighted when absent (Loewenstein, 1996). A cold planner cannot vividly represent the pull of a state they are not currently in, so they under-provision against it; the aroused actor cannot vividly represent the cold valuation they will return to, so they over-weight the present. Experimental manipulations of arousal confirm the behavioral consequence: induced sexual arousal increases risk-taking and shifts decision-making toward immediate gratification in both men and women (Skakoon-Sparling et al., 2016). Demo 1 lets a cold-state and a hot-state valuation be set independently to see when the ranking of a safe and a risky option reverses.

The heat of the moment reverses a preference

A safe option holds a steady value whatever the state. A risky option is valued low when calm but is inflated by arousal, so risky value = cold value + arousal × gain. Raise the arousal and watch the risky bar overtake the safe one — the ranking the calm self never predicted.

Arousal state0.20
How strongly arousal inflates the risky option (gain)50
safe (wait)60risky (now)50→ chooses the safe option
At arousal 0.20 the risky option is worth 50 against the safe option’s 60. Safe still wins, but the ranking flips once arousal passes 0.40: the cold plan is one strong state away from reversing.

Sexual delay discounting: trading a safer later against a sooner now

If arousal shifts valuation, the dimension it most sharply shifts is time. Many sexual-risk decisions are intertemporal: an immediate, unprotected encounter offers a sooner reward, while pausing for a condom, a conversation, or a different partner defers it. Framed this way, sexual risk becomes an instance of delay discounting, the general tendency to devalue a reward as the wait for it grows. The Sexual Discounting Task operationalises exactly this: it measures how much a person's stated likelihood of using a condom falls as the delay to a desired sexual encounter increases, and finds that steeper discounters are markedly more willing to have immediate unprotected sex rather than wait for protection (Johnson & Bruner, 2012).

Two findings make this more than an analogy. First, the discounting is domain-sensitive: the same individuals discount a desired partner more steeply than a less desired one, so the rate is not a fixed trait but bends to the incentive — the hallmark of a valuation process, not a simple rule. Second, pharmacological and arousal states push the rate up: reviews of experimental drug-administration studies find that acute intoxication raises sexual risk-taking, consistent with a transient steepening of discounting under a visceral load (Berry & Johnson, 2018). The worked example quantifies how a modest rise in the discount rate — the kind arousal or intoxication produces — can flip a protected choice into an unprotected one, and Demo 2 lets the rate and the delay vary.

A higher discount rate flips protection into risk

The safe option — pausing for protection — is worth 100 but only after a delay, so its present value is V = A / (1 + k·D). The risky option — proceeding now — is worth a fixed 60. Arousal and intoxication steepen the discount rate k; push it up and the delayed reward sinks below the immediate one, reversing the choice.

Discount rate (k)0.020
Delay to the safe reward (D)10
0255075100present valuedelay to the safe rewardrisky now = 60V = 83.3
At k = 0.020 and delay 10, the safe reward is worth 83.3 against the immediate 60. Waiting still wins. It keeps winning until k passes 0.067, where the two are equal.

Dual control: excitation against inhibition

Why does a strong state translate into action in some people and some moments but not others? The general answer is the dual-process architecture of self-regulation: behavior is the resultant of a fast impulsive system that reacts to cues and a slow reflective system that represents goals and acts on them deliberately (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Sexuality science has its own, closely matched formalisation in the dual control model, which holds that sexual response and behavior depend on the balance between a sexual excitation system that responds to sexual cues and a sexual inhibition system that applies the brakes in response to threat, cost, or distraction (Bancroft & Janssen, 2000).

The two framings make the same prediction with different vocabulary: sexual behavior follows the drive when excitation is high and inhibition is low, and is checked when inhibition prevails, so individuals high in propensity for excitation and low in propensity for inhibition are the most prone to risky sexual decisions. This is the same logic that governs the broader self-control literature — most directly the hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification, in which a hot, emotional, cue-triggered system overruns a cool, cognitive, goal-directed one when the hot system is strongly activated (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) — in which the effortful goal is honoured only when regulatory capacity is intact and defaults to the cue-driven option when that capacity is depleted by fatigue, intoxication, or a strong visceral load. It also links the two halves of this article: the inhibition the model relies on is an executive function, the very faculty whose weakness predicts greater sexual risk (Rowe et al., 2021). Demo 3 stages the contest, letting excitation and inhibition vary to show when behavior is released or restrained.

Excitation against inhibition

The dual control model makes sexual behavior a balance of two systems. A sexual excitation system responds to a cue and drives approach, so excitation drive = cue × propensity; a sexual inhibition system applies the brake. Behavior is released only when the drive clears the brake, so high excitation with low inhibition is the risky profile.

Strength of the sexual cue0.70
Propensity for excitation (SES)0.60
Propensity for inhibition (SIS)0.50
thresholdexcite 0.42inhibit 0.50→ behavior inhibited
The cue drives excitation to 0.42 against an inhibitory brake of 0.50. Inhibition holds by 0.08, so the behavior is checked — raise the cue or excitation, or lower inhibition, to release it.

Worked Example

Model a single sexual-risk choice as a comparison of two discounted values. The safer option — pausing to obtain protection — delivers a reward of magnitude A = 100 utils but only after a delay of D = 10 (arbitrary time units, the wait to secure a condom). The riskier option — proceeding immediately without protection — delivers a fixed, undelayed reward of R = 60 utils. Using the standard hyperbolic discounting of the delayed reward, its present value is

Vsafe = A / (1 + kD)

In a cold, unaroused state the person discounts shallowly, say k = 0.02. Then

Vsafe = 100 / (1 + 0.02 × 10) = 100 / 1.2 = 83.3

Because 83.3 > 60, the discounted value of waiting exceeds the immediate reward, and the person chooses the protected option. Now let arousal (or intoxication) steepen the discount rate to k = 0.10 — the transient rise that visceral states produce. The same delayed reward is now worth

Vsafe = 100 / (1 + 0.10 × 10) = 100 / 2 = 50.0

Now 50 < 60, so the ranking reverses and the person chooses the immediate, unprotected option — without any change in how much they value protection in the abstract, in the delay, or in the reward magnitudes. Only the discount rate moved. The indifference rate, at which the two options are exactly equal, solves 100 / (1 + 10k) = 60, giving k = 0.0667: below it the safe choice wins, above it the risky one does. This is the arithmetic of the heat of the moment — a modest, state-driven rise in a single parameter is enough to flip a sincerely preferred precaution into its opposite. Demo 2 recomputes Vsafe and the chosen option as k and D are varied.

Discussion

Placing sexual behavior inside cognitive psychology does two things. It replaces a picture of fixed sexual preferences with a state-dependent valuation account, in which the decisive variable is not what a person wants in general but the state from which a given choice is made; and it recognises that sexual risk is not a special, sealed-off domain but an instance of the same intertemporal and self-regulatory machinery that governs eating, spending, and addiction. The two directions are joined in a loop. If a strong visceral state steepens discounting and overruns inhibition, and the inhibition it overruns is an executive function, then the people and moments with the least regulatory capacity are exactly those in which the state does the most damage — so sexual risk concentrates where cognitive control is already scarce (Rowe et al., 2021; Johnson & Bruner, 2012).

Two cautions keep the account honest. First, much of the arousal-and-decision evidence comes from self-reported hypothetical ratings or from laboratory inductions that cannot reproduce the full intensity of a real sexual situation, so the size of the hot–cold gap in the field is uncertain even though its direction is robust (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Skakoon-Sparling et al., 2016). Second, the discounting and dual-control models are descriptions of a valuation contest, not a full theory of which process — craving, habit, mispredicted affect, social pressure — dominates in a given case; naming the parameter that moved does not identify the mechanism that moved it. Nor is the within-individual decision account the only level of analysis: complementary framings treat sexual behavior as social exchange, as in sexual economics theory, which models sex as a resource negotiated between partners rather than a choice computed in one head (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). The cognitive framing is powerful precisely because it is general, but that generality is also its limit.

Current Directions

The most active front connects sexual risk to measurable cognitive control. Studies in high-incidence settings now test whether executive function predicts sexual-risk behavior prospectively, finding in young women that weaker executive function is associated with riskier behavior and with HIV status, which reframes prevention as partly a question of cognitive capacity rather than knowledge alone (Rowe et al., 2021). A second front pushes the visceral-state account into pharmacology: systematic reviews of controlled drug-administration studies ask whether intoxication causes rather than merely accompanies sexual risk-taking, a causal question that observational data cannot settle (Berry & Johnson, 2018). A third refines the discounting approach itself, using the Sexual Discounting Task to show that the rate is partner- and context-specific rather than a single trait, which suggests interventions should target the valuation of particular high-risk situations rather than a person's general impulsivity (Johnson & Bruner, 2012). The open question uniting them is whether sexual risk is best reduced by lowering arousal-driven discounting in the moment, by strengthening inhibitory control over time, or by restructuring situations so the risky option is never the immediate default.

Common Misconceptions

Sexual risk-taking just reflects a person's stable preferences.
Preference for risk is strongly state-dependent. The same person rates risky options far more favourably while aroused than while calm, and does not anticipate the shift, so a sexual choice reflects the state it was made in as much as any enduring trait (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006).
People take sexual risks because they do not understand the dangers.
Knowledge is often intact; the failure is at the point of choice. Sexual risk tracks how steeply a person discounts delayed rewards and how weak their inhibitory control is, not how well informed they are, which is why education alone changes behavior less than expected (Johnson & Bruner, 2012; Rowe et al., 2021).
Arousal only affects the body, not judgement.
Sexual arousal is a visceral factor that directly reshapes valuation: while active it inflates the appeal of immediate options and narrows attention onto the goal it serves, and it is underweighted when absent, so it distorts decisions, not just physiology (Loewenstein, 1996).
Sexual behavior is a special domain with its own separate psychology.
Its central mechanisms are general ones. Delay discounting, dual-process self-regulation, and visceral influence govern eating, spending, and addiction as much as sex; sexual behavior is a sharp test case for them, not an exception to them (Strack & Deutsch, 2004).

Glossary

Cold–hot empathy gap.
The systematic failure to predict one's own behavior across visceral states: a calm person underestimates how arousal will change their choices, and an aroused person misjudges their calm valuation.
Delay discounting.
The devaluation of a reward as the wait for it grows; the general mechanism that makes an immediate unprotected encounter outcompete a safer but delayed one when the discount rate is high.
Dual control model.
A sexuality-science account holding that sexual response and behavior depend on the balance between a sexual excitation system and a sexual inhibition system, the domain-specific form of dual-process self-regulation.
Executive function.
The control processes — working memory, inhibition, updating — that regulate goal-directed behavior; weaker executive function predicts greater sexual risk-taking.
Heat-of-the-moment effect.
The reversal of sexual preference under arousal relative to a calm baseline, together with the failure to anticipate that reversal in advance.
Hyperbolic discounting.
The form in which discounted value falls as A / (1 + kD) with delay D and rate k; its curvature produces preference reversals when the discount rate changes.
Impulsive system.
The fast, cue-driven, associative route to behavior in dual-process models; its immediate pull toward a sexual cue does not wait on deliberation.
Reflective system.
The slow, deliberate, goal-representing route to behavior in dual-process models; it carries a precautionary intention but is effortful and easily outcompeted.
Sexual behavior.
The actions by which organisms seek and engage in sexual activity, together with the decisions, courtship, and risk choices surrounding them; defined here as a decision domain.
Sexual Discounting Task.
A behavioral measure of how a person's likelihood of using a condom falls as the delay to a desired encounter increases, operationalising sexual risk as delay discounting.
Sexual excitation system (SES).
In the dual control model, the system that responds to sexual cues by promoting arousal and approach; high propensity for excitation raises the readiness to act on a sexual opportunity.
Sexual inhibition system (SIS).
In the dual control model, the system that applies the brakes to sexual response in reaction to threat, cost, or distraction; low propensity for inhibition is associated with riskier sexual decisions.
Sexual strategies theory.
An evolutionary account of human mating that treats short- and long-term mating as distinct strategies with distinct cognitive and preference signatures (Buss & Schmitt, 1993).
Visceral factor.
A bodily-motivational state — hunger, pain, craving, sexual arousal — that directly and transiently inflates the value of acting on it and is underweighted when not currently felt.

Key Researchers

Dan Ariely

(Duke University, Fuqua School of Business). Co-authored the foundational demonstration that sexual arousal predictably and unexpectedly shifts sexual decision-making, establishing the empirical heat-of-the-moment effect. Google Scholar · Wikipedia

Roy F. Baumeister

(University of Queensland, School of Psychology). Developed sexual economics theory and influential accounts of self-regulation and ego depletion that bear directly on the control of sexual behavior. Google Scholar · Wikipedia

David M. Buss

(University of Texas at Austin, Department of Psychology). Originated sexual strategies theory, the evolutionary-psychological framework for the cognition and preferences underlying human mating. Faculty page · Wikipedia

Erick Janssen

(KU Leuven, Institute for Family and Sexuality Studies). Co-developed the dual control model of sexual response, formalising sexual behavior as a balance of excitation and inhibition. ORCID · Google Scholar

Matthew W. Johnson

(Sheppard Pratt). Developed the Sexual Discounting Task, bringing the methods of behavioral economics and delay discounting to the measurement of sexual risk. Google Scholar

George Loewenstein

(Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Social and Decision Sciences). Originated the visceral-factors account of decision-making and co-authored the arousal-and-sexual-decision study that anchors this topic. Google Scholar · Wikipedia

Walter Mischel

(1930–2018; Columbia University, Department of Psychology). Developed the hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification that underpins the self-regulation framing of sexual choice. Faculty page · Wikipedia

Frequently Asked Questions

How does sexual arousal affect decision-making and risk-taking?

Sexual arousal is a visceral state that predictably reshapes valuation while it lasts. Experimental work shows that aroused people rate risky and impulsive sexual options as far more appealing than they do when calm, are more willing to forgo protection, and do not anticipate the size of the shift in advance. In decision terms, arousal steepens delay discounting and weakens inhibitory control, so the same person makes systematically riskier choices in a hot state than in a cold one.

What is the heat-of-the-moment effect in sexual behavior?

It is the reversal of sexual preference under arousal relative to a calm baseline, together with the failure to predict that reversal beforehand. A person can sincerely plan cautious behavior while unaroused and then act otherwise once aroused, because the cold planner cannot vividly represent the hot state and under-provisions against it. The effect is a leading example of how transient states, not stable traits, can drive a single decision.

Many sexual-risk decisions are intertemporal: an immediate unprotected encounter is a sooner reward, while pausing for protection defers it. Research using the Sexual Discounting Task shows that people who discount delayed rewards more steeply are more willing to have immediate unprotected sex rather than wait for a condom. This reframes sexual risk as an instance of the same valuation process studied in addiction and impulsivity, rather than a separate phenomenon.

Does executive function predict sexual decision-making?

Yes. Weaker executive function, the set of control processes including working memory and inhibition, is associated prospectively with greater sexual risk-taking and, in some high-incidence settings, with HIV status in young people. Because executive function is also the capacity that holds a precautionary plan in place against a strong drive, sexual risk tends to concentrate where cognitive control is already limited.

What is the dual control model of sexual response?

It is a sexuality-science framework holding that sexual response and behavior depend on the balance between a sexual excitation system that responds to sexual cues and a sexual inhibition system that applies the brakes in response to threat or cost. It is the domain-specific counterpart of dual-process self-regulation in cognitive psychology, and it predicts that people high in excitation and low in inhibition are the most prone to risky sexual choices.

Why do people make sexual choices they later regret?

Because the choice and the regret are made from different states. A decision made under arousal weights the immediate reward heavily and the delayed cost lightly, while the later, calm self weights them the other way. This cold-hot empathy gap means regret is not evidence of a changed mind but of a changed state, and it explains why precommitment and situation-level strategies often work better than in-the-moment willpower.

How do intoxication and drugs influence sexual decision-making?

Reviews of controlled drug-administration studies indicate that acute intoxication raises sexual risk-taking, consistent with a transient steepening of delay discounting and a weakening of inhibitory control under a visceral load. Because these are experimental rather than purely observational data, they help address whether intoxication causes risky sexual choices rather than merely co-occurring with them.

Is sexual behavior governed by the same cognitive processes as other decisions?

Largely, yes. Delay discounting, dual-process self-regulation, and visceral influence govern eating, spending, and addiction as well as sex. What makes sexual behavior a revealing case is the unusual speed and intensity of its driving state, which throws these general mechanisms into sharp relief rather than requiring a psychology of its own.

References

Ariely, D., & Loewenstein, G. (2006). The heat of the moment: The effect of sexual arousal on sexual decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(2), 87–98. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.501

Bancroft, J., & Janssen, E. (2000). The dual control model of male sexual response: A theoretical approach to centrally mediated erectile dysfunction. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 24(5), 571–579. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0149-7634(00)00024-5

Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2004). Sexual economics: Sex as female resource for social exchange in heterosexual interactions. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(4), 339–363. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_2

Berry, M. S., & Johnson, M. W. (2018). Does being drunk or high cause HIV sexual risk behavior? A systematic review and meta-analysis of drug administration studies. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 164, 125–138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pbb.2017.08.009

Buss, D. M., & Schmitt, D. P. (1993). Sexual strategies theory: An evolutionary perspective on human mating. Psychological Review, 100(2), 204–232. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.100.2.204

Johnson, M. W., & Bruner, N. R. (2012). The Sexual Discounting Task: HIV risk behavior and the discounting of delayed sexual rewards in cocaine dependence. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 123(1–3), 15–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2011.09.032

Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(3), 272–292. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1996.0028

Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.3

Rowe, K., Duta, M., Demeyere, N., Wagner, R. G., Pettifor, A., Kahn, K., Tollman, S., Scerif, G., & Stein, A. (2021). The relationship between executive function, risky behaviour and HIV in young women from the HPTN 068 study in South Africa. AIDS Care, 33(5), 682–692. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540121.2020.1851016

Skakoon-Sparling, S., Cramer, K. M., & Shuper, P. A. (2016). The impact of sexual arousal on sexual risk-taking and decision-making in men and women. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45(1), 33–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-015-0589-y

Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3), 220–247. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1