Abstract
Racism is a type of prejudice: a negative attitude, belief, or behavior directed at people because of their membership in a racial or ethnic group. This article develops racism as contemporary psychology treats it — less the overt hostility of mid-century bigotry than a subtle, often unacknowledged bias that coexists with egalitarian values. It separates racism from the stereotype that supplies its beliefs and the discrimination that expresses it, sets out the aversive, symbolic, and modern forms that replaced old-fashioned prejudice, and reviews the dual-process architecture and the Implicit Association Test. It then asks how individual bias scales into structural disparity, why racism harms health, and what intergroup contact can undo. A worked example and three interactive demonstrations make the ideas concrete.
Keywords: racism, aversive racism, symbolic racism, implicit bias, systemic racism
Racism is prejudice, stereotyping, or discrimination directed at a person or group on the basis of their membership in a racial or ethnic category. As a form of prejudice, it inherits that construct's structure — an attitude, grounded in categorization, that resists disconfirmation — but it is marked out by its target and by a distinctive history, because the overt, endorsed racism of the mid-twentieth century has largely given way to forms that are subtle, deniable, and frequently unrecognized by the people who hold them (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).
The modern treatment is cognitive and structural at once. The same dual-process machinery that governs prejudice in general — an automatically activated association that controlled processing may or may not override — applies to race, but racism also lives in the aggregate: in the statistical regularities of neighborhoods, institutions, and policies that no single prejudiced mind need author (Bonilla-Silva, 1997). The sections below move from the individual architecture of a racist response to the structural level at which much of racism's harm is now understood to operate.
Key Takeaways
- Racism is a race-targeted form of prejudice, distinguished from the stereotype that supplies its beliefs and the discrimination that is its behavioral expression.
- Overt, endorsed racism has largely been replaced by subtler forms — aversive, symbolic, and modern racism — in which bias coexists with a sincerely egalitarian self-image and surfaces only where a non-racial justification is available.
- The dual-process architecture separates an automatically activated racial association from the controlled processing that can override it, which is why implicit and explicit racial attitudes can diverge within the same person.
- Racism operates not only in individual minds but in aggregate social structure; the bias of crowds account treats regional and institutional disparities as the statistical signature of many individual biases interacting with context.
- Racism is a documented determinant of health, and intergroup contact remains the best-supported individual-level intervention, though structural racism is not reachable by attitude change alone.
What Racism Is
Racism is operationally a negative evaluation of, or differential behavior toward, people because they are categorized into a racial or ethnic group (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). As with prejudice generally, three allied terms are worth holding apart. A *racial stereotype* is the cognitive component, a belief about the attributes of a racial group; *racism* in the narrow attitudinal sense is the affective and evaluative component, a feeling about the group; and *racial discrimination* is the behavioral component, the differential treatment of people on the basis of their race. The components are correlated but dissociable, and much of what is distinctive about modern racism lies precisely in their coming apart — explicit evaluations have grown egalitarian while automatic associations and discriminatory outcomes have proved far more stubborn.
What marks racism off from prejudice in general is that race is a socially constructed but historically entrenched category, so the associations attached to it are reinforced by centuries of structure as well as by individual learning. Bonilla-Silva argued that racism is best understood not as a collection of individual bad attitudes but as a property of a *racialized social system*, in which races are placed in a hierarchy that distributes resources and that reproduces itself through ordinary, often race-neutral-seeming practices (Bonilla-Silva, 1997). On this view the cognitive account of individual bias and the structural account are complementary levels of description of one phenomenon, not rivals.
Types of Racism
The Medical Subject Headings vocabulary files *Racism* (D063505) as a narrower term under prejudice, under social discrimination, and under race relations, and lists one narrower descriptor directly beneath it, shown in Table 1. The single indexed subtype does not exhaust the kinds of racism the research literature distinguishes — aversive, symbolic, modern, and institutional racism are all well established — because the table is an *indexing classification*, a controlled vocabulary built so that the published literature can be retrieved, not a theory that carves racism at its natural joints. It records how the literature is indexed, not what the true types are, and the subtype below is not mutually exclusive with the cognitive forms discussed later in this article.
| Subtype | In brief |
|---|---|
| Systemic Racism | Racism embedded in the laws, policies, and institutional practices of a society, producing racial disparities independently of any individual's prejudicial intent. |
The Cognitive Architecture of Racism
The decisive insight of the modern literature is that racism went underground rather than away. The theory of aversive racism holds that many people who sincerely endorse egalitarian values nonetheless harbor negative racial associations they find aversive to admit; the result is a person who is not consciously prejudiced yet discriminates under cover of a non-racial rationale (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). The signature prediction is that discrimination appears not where norms clearly forbid it but where the situation is ambiguous enough to supply an innocent explanation. Figure 1 sets out that pattern.
Figure 1
The Aversive Racism Pattern
A selection study spanning a decade showed the pattern directly: White participants did not discriminate against a Black candidate when the candidate's qualifications were unambiguously strong or unambiguously weak, but did discriminate when qualifications were ambiguous and a merit-based rationale was available to justify the choice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). A closely related construct, symbolic racism, locates modern anti-Black attitudes in a blend of early-socialized negative affect with traditional values such as individualism, expressed as the belief that a group violates cherished norms rather than as open claims of racial inferiority (Sears & Henry, 2003). The AversiveRacismExplorer lets the reader vary how ambiguous a decision is and watch the discrimination gap appear and disappear.
Aversive Racism Explorer
Two equally qualified applicants, one White and one Black, are rated by a decision-maker who holds egalitarian values. When the qualifications are unambiguous, the two are recommended at the same rate; as the decision becomes ambiguous and a merit-based rationale becomes available, a gap favouring the in-group appears. Raise the ambiguity, then make the anti-discrimination norm salient and watch the gap close.
The mapping is illustrative of the direction and rough magnitude of the aversive-racism selection studies; it is not a fitted model of any single experiment.
The content of racial stereotypes is not arbitrary. The stereotype content model holds that group stereotypes vary along two dimensions, warmth and competence, whose values follow from the group's structural position, and that different racial and ethnic groups occupy different quadrants of that space, each tied to a distinct emotional prejudice from admiration to contempt (Fiske et al., 2002). Because the automatic component of racial attitudes operates outside deliberate control, self-report cannot reach it; the Implicit Association Test addressed this by measuring the relative speed with which people pair racial concepts with evaluative attributes, on the logic that two concepts sharing a strong association are faster to map onto a single response key (Greenwald et al., 1998). The dual-process account that frames all of this was first set out for stereotyping in general, separating an automatically activated association shared by nearly everyone from the controlled processing by which low-prejudice people override it (Devine, 1989).
From Attitude to Action
The step from a racial attitude to a racially disparate outcome runs through two very different routes. The first is the individual act under pressure. In the first-person-shooter task, participants decide whether to shoot armed targets and withhold fire from unarmed ones; they are faster and more accurate to shoot armed Black targets and to spare unarmed White targets than the reverse, a bias in the speed and threshold of a split-second decision rather than in a considered judgment (Correll et al., 2002). Such findings show how an automatic racial association can govern behavior precisely when controlled processing has no time to intervene.
The second route is aggregation. The bias of crowds account argues that implicit bias is better understood as a property of situations and populations than of individuals: a person's implicit-test score is unstable across time, but the *average* bias of the people in a place is stable and tracks that place's structural racial disparities, so implicit bias is best measured and addressed at the level of the neighborhood, institution, or region rather than the single mind (Payne et al., 2017). On this view the gap between a noisy individual measure and a robust aggregate one is not a flaw but the central fact: racism scales from attitude to action by many biased decisions compounding through a shared environment. The BiasOfCrowds demonstration makes that aggregation concrete.
The Bias of Crowds
An individual’s implicit-bias score is unstable from one occasion to the next, but the average bias of the people in a place is stable and tracks that place’s structural racial disparity. Set the structural disparity of a context, then increase the number of people aggregated to watch the average settle onto the structural level while any single score stays scattered.
Individual scores are generated by a fixed deterministic function for illustration; the point is the contrast between a noisy single estimate and a stable aggregate, not any specific data.
Reducing Racism
The oldest and best-supported individual-level intervention is intergroup contact. Allport proposed that contact reduces prejudice when the groups have equal status within the situation, pursue common goals, cooperate rather than compete, and enjoy the support of authorities (Allport, 1954). The empirical verdict came from a meta-analysis of more than 500 studies: contact was associated with lower prejudice in the large majority of samples, the optimal conditions strengthened but were not required for the effect, and the reduction generalized beyond the specific individuals encountered (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). A review of contemporary prejudice set the aversive-racism findings in this corrective frame, noting that because modern bias is subtle and justification-dependent, interventions must change situations and norms, not only hearts (Pearson et al., 2009).
A second family of interventions targets the automatic component directly. Devine and colleagues framed implicit bias as a breakable habit and taught a set of strategies — stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging, individuation, perspective taking, and increased contact — producing a reduction in implicit race bias that persisted for two months (Devine et al., 2012). The broader picture is more sobering, and the structural turn sharpens the caution: a cultural-psychological analysis argues that racism is reproduced by the everyday material and institutional environment, so interventions aimed only at individual attitudes leave the structures that regenerate bias untouched (Salter et al., 2018). A policy review drew the organizational conclusion, arguing that implicit-bias training alone rarely changes behavior and that durable change requires altering the policies and incentives that produce disparate outcomes (Onyeador et al., 2021).
Worked Example
The race Implicit Association Test scores a relative automatic preference from the difference in response speed between two combined sorting tasks. In the *congruent* block, one racial group shares a response key with 'good' and the other with 'bad'; the *incongruent* block reverses the pairing. If the first pairing matches a participant's automatic associations, responses in the congruent block are faster. The modern scoring procedure expresses that difference as the *D* measure: the difference between the two block means divided by the standard deviation of all the response latencies in the two blocks, which standardizes the effect in units of the participant's own variability (Greenwald et al., 1998).
Consider a participant whose correct-trial latencies, in milliseconds, are as follows:
| Block | Trial latencies (ms) | Mean (ms) |
|---|---|---|
| Congruent | 470, 560, 700, 850, 520, 640, 790, 610 | 642.5 |
| Incongruent | 560, 650, 760, 900, 610, 720, 860, 700 | 720.0 |
The congruent block mean is (470 + 560 + 700 + 850 + 520 + 640 + 790 + 610) / 8 = 642.5 ms, and the incongruent block mean is 720.0 ms, so the participant is 77.5 ms slower when the group must share a key with 'good' against their automatic association. To standardize, pool all sixteen latencies and compute their standard deviation, which is 126.85 ms. The *D* measure is therefore the difference of means divided by this inclusive standard deviation, 77.5 / 126.85 = 0.61. By the conventional benchmarks, a *D* near 0.15 is slight, 0.35 moderate, and 0.65 strong, so 0.61 indicates a moderate-to-strong automatic preference for the group paired with 'good' in the congruent block. The measure is relative, not absolute: it records which pairing is easier for this participant, not a quantity of animus, and a single administration is a noisy estimate — the instability that motivates the aggregate, bias-of-crowds approach. The ImplicitAssociationDemo lets the reader adjust the block latencies and watch the means, the pooled standard deviation, and *D* update; the numbers here are illustrative of the scoring procedure, not drawn from a specific dataset.
Implicit Association Scoring
The IAT infers an automatic association from response speed: faster responses when a racial group shares a key with “good” than with “bad” imply a positive automatic association. Edit the eight latencies in each block (milliseconds) to see how the means, the pooled standard deviation, and the D measure respond. The defaults reproduce the worked example.
D is relative, not absolute: it records which pairing is easier for this respondent, not a quantity of animus, and one administration is a noisy estimate.
Discussion
The study of racism has moved on two axes at once. Along the first, the unit of analysis shifted from the overt bigot to the ordinary person whose egalitarian values coexist with automatic associations they neither endorse nor fully control, a reframing that made aversive, symbolic, and modern racism the central objects of study and that gave the automatic component a measure in the Implicit Association Test (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998). Along the second, the level of analysis widened from the individual mind to the racialized social system, so that disparities are read as the output of structure and aggregation rather than the sum of private animus (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Payne et al., 2017).
The open problems lie where the two axes meet. The relationship between an individual's implicit measure and that same individual's behavior is weaker and less stable than early enthusiasm assumed, even as the aggregate version of the measure predicts regional disparity well — a dissociation the bias-of-crowds account turns into its organizing principle but that still strains the inference from any one score to any one act (Payne et al., 2017). The behavior that implicit associations most reliably shape may be the interaction itself rather than any discrete decision: managing an interracial encounter draws on executive resources, so that the effort to appear unbiased can leave a person cognitively depleted and paradoxically read as cold or distant by the very partner they are trying to reassure (Richeson & Shelton, 2007). The intervention evidence is correspondingly uneven: contact has strong meta-analytic support, implicit-bias training has weak and fleeting effects, and the structural level that may matter most is the least tractable to the experimental methods the field knows best (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Onyeador et al., 2021).
Current Directions
The most consequential recent development treats racism as a determinant of physical health. A systematic review and meta-analysis of hundreds of studies found that self-reported racial discrimination is associated with poorer mental health and, more modestly, poorer physical health across populations, establishing exposure to racism as a measurable health risk rather than only a moral or civic problem (Paradies et al., 2015). A subsequent review mapped the pathways — the stress physiology of chronic discrimination, the residential and economic effects of structural racism, and the role of internalized bias — and argued that reducing racial health disparities requires intervening at the structural level, not only the interpersonal (Williams et al., 2019).
A second front tracks whether racial attitudes are changing at scale. Charlesworth and Banaji analyzed millions of implicit and explicit attitude tests collected over a decade and found that implicit race attitudes moved modestly toward neutrality while explicit ones changed faster, demonstrating that automatic racial associations are neither fixed nor quickly malleable but follow a slow, attitude-specific trajectory (Charlesworth & Banaji, 2019). Together with the structural and bias-of-crowds work, these lines are pushing the field toward longitudinal, population-level, and health-outcome evidence, and away from treating a single laboratory score as the measure of a person's racism (Payne et al., 2017; Salter et al., 2018).
Common Misconceptions
- Racism is only the conscious hatred held by a prejudiced minority.
- Aversive and modern racism describe bias in people who sincerely endorse egalitarian values; discrimination appears where the situation supplies a non-racial justification rather than through open hostility (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).
- A high race Implicit Association Test score proves a person will discriminate.
- The test yields a relative, noisy index of an automatic association; a single administration is unstable and does not reliably predict any individual's behavior, which is why the bias-of-crowds account measures bias at the population level instead (Payne et al., 2017).
- Ending individual prejudice would end racism.
- Racism is reproduced by laws, institutions, and everyday material environments that generate disparities independently of individual intent, so attitude change alone leaves structural racism intact (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Salter et al., 2018).
Glossary
- Aversive racism.
- A form of racial bias in which a person endorsing egalitarian values nonetheless holds negative associations and discriminates only where a non-racial justification is available.
- Bias of crowds.
- The account treating implicit bias as a stable property of populations and situations rather than individuals, so that aggregate bias tracks structural disparity better than any single score.
- Color-blind racism.
- An ideology that explains racial inequality through ostensibly race-neutral terms such as market forces or culture, thereby justifying the racial status quo without overt racial claims.
- Discrimination.
- The behavioral component of racial bias: differential treatment of people on the basis of their racial or ethnic group membership.
- Dual-process model.
- The account separating the automatic activation of a racial association from the controlled processing that can inhibit or override it.
- Implicit Association Test.
- A reaction-time measure that infers an automatic association from the relative speed of pairing racial concepts with evaluative attributes.
- Implicit bias.
- An attitude or stereotype that operates automatically and outside awareness to influence judgment and action.
- Institutional racism.
- Racial discrimination embedded in the normal operation of organizations and institutions, producing disparate outcomes without requiring individual prejudicial intent.
- Modern racism.
- A contemporary form of anti-outgroup attitude expressed as opposition to policies framed in race-neutral terms rather than as open claims of racial inferiority.
- Prejudice.
- A negative attitude or affective response toward people because of their membership in a social group; racism is its race-targeted form.
- Racialized social system.
- Bonilla-Silva's conception of a society whose economic, political, and social structures place races in a hierarchy that reproduces racial advantage.
- Racism.
- Prejudice, stereotyping, or discrimination directed at people on the basis of their membership in a racial or ethnic group.
- Social categorization.
- The rapid, often involuntary placement of a person into a social group, which brings the evaluations learned for that category to bear on perception.
- Stereotype content model.
- The framework placing group stereotypes on dimensions of warmth and competence, predicting distinct emotions and forms of prejudice.
- Stereotype.
- The cognitive component of racial bias: a belief about the attributes shared by members of a racial or ethnic group.
- Symbolic racism.
- A blend of early-socialized negative racial affect with traditional values, expressed as the belief that a racial group violates cherished norms such as self-reliance.
- Systemic racism.
- Racism embedded in the laws, policies, and institutional practices of a society, producing racial disparities independently of individual prejudicial intent.
Key Researchers
Gordon W. Allport
(1897–1967). Professor at Harvard University whose 1954 book *The Nature of Prejudice* grounded prejudice in ordinary categorization and set out the contact hypothesis that still anchors the reduction of racism.
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Mahzarin R. Banaji
(Harvard University). Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics whose work on implicit social cognition and long-term attitude change mapped how racial bias operates and how slowly it shifts.
ORCID - Wikidata
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva
(Duke University). James B. Duke Professor of Sociology whose theory of racialized social systems and color-blind racism located racism in social structure rather than individual attitudes alone.
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Patricia G. Devine
(University of Wisconsin–Madison). Professor of psychology whose dual-process account separated automatic from controlled components of racial bias and whose habit-breaking intervention produced durable reductions in implicit race bias.
ORCID - Wikidata
John F. Dovidio
(Yale University). Carl Iver Hovland Professor of Psychology and a principal architect of aversive-racism theory, documenting how subtle bias surfaces when a non-racial justification is available.
ORCID - Wikidata
Susan T. Fiske
(Princeton University). Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs who developed the stereotype content model and the BIAS map linking warmth and competence to emotional prejudices and discrimination.
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Anthony G. Greenwald
(University of Washington). Professor emeritus of psychology and co-creator of the Implicit Association Test, which made automatic racial attitudes measurable.
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Jennifer A. Richeson
(Yale University). Philip R. Allen Professor of Psychology whose work charts the cognitive costs of interracial interaction and the misperception of racial economic progress.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What is racism in psychology?
Racism is prejudice, stereotyping, or discrimination directed at people because of their membership in a racial or ethnic group; psychologically it is the race-targeted form of prejudice, combining a belief, a negative feeling, and a differential behavior (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).
What is aversive racism?
Aversive racism is bias in people who sincerely hold egalitarian values but harbor unacknowledged negative associations; they discriminate only when a situation supplies a non-racial justification that protects their non-prejudiced self-image (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).
How is racism different from prejudice?
Racism is a specific form of prejudice defined by its racial or ethnic target and its distinctive history; it shares prejudice's attitudinal structure but also operates at the structural level of institutions and social systems (Bonilla-Silva, 1997).
What is symbolic racism?
Symbolic racism is a blend of early-learned negative racial affect with traditional values such as individualism, expressed as the belief that a racial group violates cherished norms rather than as open claims of inferiority (Sears & Henry, 2003).
Does a high score on the race Implicit Association Test mean I am racist?
No. The test gives a relative, noisy index of an automatic association, not a measure of conscious belief, and a single administration does not reliably predict how an individual will behave, which is why bias is better assessed at the population level (Payne et al., 2017).
What is systemic racism?
Systemic racism is racism embedded in laws, policies, and institutional practices that produce racial disparities independently of any individual's prejudicial intent; it is the MeSH-indexed subtype of racism and a level of analysis distinct from individual bias (Bonilla-Silva, 1997).
Does racism affect health?
Yes. A systematic review and meta-analysis found that experiences of racial discrimination are associated with worse mental and physical health, establishing racism as a measurable determinant of health (Paradies et al., 2015).
What reduces racism?
Intergroup contact has the strongest meta-analytic support at the individual level, especially under equal-status, cooperative, goal-sharing, institutionally supported conditions, but structural racism requires changing policies and environments rather than attitudes alone (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Onyeador et al., 2021).
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